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NOTES AND COMMENT
and the courts and legislatures are striving diligently to round out
the proper legal procedure.
BENNETT D. BROWN.
THE LIFE INsURANcE TRUST.
Although the insurance trust was employed in America as long
ago as 18691 and was actively advocated during the ensuing years,2
it has assumed real importance during the last decade and a half.3
Statistics indicate that'at the close of 1930 over four billion dollars
of insurance trusts were in existence.4 These trusts have been classi-
fied in two outstanding groups, known as the unfunded and funded
trusts.
stimulate private enterprise in housing and provide the low-income groups with
the necessary funds for paying their rent. N. Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1936, at 8.
In his interesting article, supra note 44, Mr. Holden suggests another
solution to the troublesome problem of constitutional sanction. He proposes
that the President make recommendations for slum clearance and low-cost
housing through his various fact-finding agencies, which recommendations he
is authorized to make by virtue of the power "to give to the Congress informa-
tion of the state of the Union, and to recommend to their consideration such
measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient," vested in him by Article
II, Section 3, of the Constitution. It has been held that he may appropriate
money to prepare such information. Then Congress, under its authority "to
coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin," granted in Article
I, Section 8, clause 5, may put his recommendations into effect by appropriate
legislation. Thus, "through intelligent exercise of monetary control," Mr.
Holden concludes, "there is vested in Congress power adequate to accelerate
or retard the flow of credit for housing and for rebuilding and rehabilitation
of the undesirable sections of our cities."
'POWELL, TRUSTS AND ESTATES (1932) 48. The Girard Trust Co. of
Philadelphia was trustee.
'STEPHENSON, LIVING TRUSTS (1926) 19. The Provident Life & Trust
Co. of Philadelphia was its vigorous exponent.
'The late beginning of insurance is one of the reasons for the late rise of
insurance trusts. Although the first life insurance company in the, United
States, the Presbyterian Ministers' Fund of Philadelphia, was chartered in
1759, most existing companies in the United States were chartered within the
last fifty years. See STEPHENSON, Op. cit. supra note 2.
In fact, up to 1926, the sums placed in insurance trusts were negligible.
STEPHENSON, Op. cit. supra note 2. In the three ensuing years, insurance trusts
valued at over a billion dollars were created. 50 Trust Companies Magazine
363 (1930). See Address by F. H. Sisson, 1928, A Record Year for Trust
Service, published by Guaranty Trust Co., New York City.
'Estimate by Trust Division of The American Banker's Ass'n, no later
figures available; Note (1936) 45 HARV. L. REV. 896. The number of trusts
that actually take effect at insured's death is not known. Revocations have not
been considerable. One large trust company informed Professor Powell,
op. cit. supra note 1, that revocations of trusts created before 1928 were 3%o of
the total; in 1929, 4.3%; in 1930, 2.4%, and in 1931, 2.9%.
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The unfunded insurance trust is employed in the great ma-
jority of cases.5 In this type of trust, the settlor who has procured
an insurance policy on his life or the life of another either assigns
it o to the trustee or executes a trust agreement naming a third party
as trustee-beneficiary, that is, not only is a third party designated
as the trustee in the trust agreement but, also, he is made the bene-
ficiary under the insurance policy and receives the proceeds of the
policy by virtue of the latter status. The cestui is the person for
the benefit of whom the trustee-beneficiary receives the proceeds.
The cestui is the beneficiary under the trust agreement, not under
the insurance policy. The trust agreement provides for the disposi-
tion of the proceeds 7 of the policy for the benefit of persons named
in the agreement, i. e., the cestuis. The insured or settlor pays the
premiums as they come due.
The funded trust 8 is created in the same manner as the un-
funded trust. It possesses, however, one additional feature in that
at the time of the agreement, the settlor transfers to the trustee
securities, 9 the income from which is to be used to pay the premiums
on the insurance policy.
The Non-Testamentary Character of the Insurance Trust.
In most states,10 the life insurance trust, whether created by
assignment of the policy or change of beneficiary, has been held to
'William Ludwig, N. Y. L. J., Oct. 14, 1935, at 1254.
'REMSEN, in PREPARATION OF WILLS AND TRUSTS (1930) 313, declares
that most funded insurance trusts and some unfunded trusts are created by
instruments with words of assignment to the trustee.
The trustee, having the duty of collecting the proceeds, representing the
cestuis and defending the trust in litigation, cannot be considered a passive
trustee. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. O'Brien, 27 F. (2d) 773 (D. C. W. D. Mich.
1927), appeal dismissed, 22 F. (2d) 1016).
Many states (Conn., Iowa, Mass., Miss., Ore., Vt., N. Y. [within restric-
tions], Del.) permit insurance companies to act as trustee and do not require
the segregation of the trust fundT. This would seem to be a violation of the
principle that a trust res must exist before a trust can arise. See 2 BOGERT,
TIE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) § 240, for criticism of the insurance
company trust.
'Hanna, Some Legal Aspects of Life Insurance Trusts (1930) 78 U. OF
PA. L. REv. 346; see also SHArTUCK, LIVING TRUSTS (1928) 18 et seq.
'See Funded Insurance Trust Agreement, Equitable Trust Co. of N. Y.,
where insurance policies are designated "Trust Estate B" and the securities
from which income to pay premiums is to be derived is termed "Trust Estate A."
For an exposition of three minor variations of the funded and unfunded
trusts, the retiring, cumulative and business trusts, see Hanna, loc. cit. supra
note 8; the Financial Digest, May, 1928, p. 4; N. Y. PENAL LAW § 665 (1907) ;
N. Y. ANN. CONSOL LAWS (2d ed. 1917) § 732; Topken, Loring & Schwartz,
Inc. v. Schwartz, 249 N. Y. 206, 163 N. E. 735 (1928).
"0 The various states have passed "countless" statutes, but Mr. Grahame,
The Insurance Trustee as Non-Testamentary 'Disposition' (1934) 18 MINN. L.
REv. 391, has found that most of them deal with mainly non-testamentary
insurance trusts and therefore do not help in the solution of doubtful cases.
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be a non-testamentary disposition." According to substantial au-
thority, the entire interest, subject to the reservation of the power
of revocation, passes to the trustee-beneficiary during the life of the
settlor, and the only effect of his death is to end the possibility that
the interest might be revoked.' 2  If the settlor does not reserve the
right to revoke the assignment13 or change the beneficiary, there is
n BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 7, § 235. See POWELL, CASES ON TRUSTS AND
ESTATES (1933) 1021, 1022. Johnston v. Scott, 76 Misc. 641, 137 N. Y. Supp.
243 (Sup. Ct. 1912) ; Gurnett v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 268 Ill. App. 518, 191
N. E. 250 (1932); Bose v. Meury, 112 N. J. Eq. 62, 163 Atl. 276 (1932)
(Question as to testamentary disposition was considered irrelevant here, but
since New Jersey has always staunchly upheld the rights of the beneficiary,
requiring the procedure set forth in the policy to be followed before beneficiary
loses his rights, Mr. Grahame, loc. cit. supra note 10, at 403, declares, "it may
be assumed that the beneficiary-trustee was considered to have had rights
during the insured's lifetime.") ; Jones v. Old Colony Trust Co., 251 Mass. 309,
146 N. E. 716 (1925); Matter of Haedrich, 134 Misc. 741, 236 N. Y. Supp.
395 (Surr. Ct. 1929), aff'd, 256 N. Y. 608, 177 N. E. 160 (1931) (Court held
that the insurance trust could not be testamentary because the insured did not
own the insurance fund and that such fund accrued to the beneficiary only
upon the death of the insured and, therefore, did not pass upon the death of
the insured, never having existed during his life.); TENN. CODE 1932 § 9596
(insurance trust is valid and need not be executed as a will) ; VANCE, INSUR-
ANCE (2d ed. 1930) § 147; REmsEN, op. cit. mpra note 6; Note (1933) 46 HARV.
L. RE V. 818; Grahame, The Rights of a Beneficiary (1933) 2 Ins. Dec. 318.
" See BOGERT, op. cit. vipra note 7. Funded insurance trusts are usually
irrevocable, the trustee or beneficiary having the right to borrow, to dividends,
cash surrender value, etc.; Hanna, loc. cit. supra note 8; see also note 18, infra.
' In order to avoid conflict between the assignee and a prior designated
beneficiary, or a preliminary change to the insured's estate, the beneficiary or
estate's consent to the change must be secured. 37 C. J. 432; Anderson v.
Broad Street Nat. Bank, 90 N. J. Eq. 78, 105 Ati. 599 (1918). The trust
companies usually have the trustee named also as beneficiary, avoiding assign-
ments. See Note (1924) 73 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 295; Dickie, Life Insurance
Trusts (Sept.-Oct. 1930) 14 U. OF DETROIT BI-MONTHLY L. REv. 23. This
policy is in line with the theory that the settlor is also an insured and should
be allowed to retain benefits usually accruing to him, i. e., rights to dividends,
cash surrender value and to borrow. See Ludwig, loc. cit. supra note 5. In
Schoenholtz v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 234 N. Y. 24, 136 N. E. 227 (1922), it
was held that an assignment of the policy had no effect on the already designated
beneficiary. It merely assigned insured's rights to proceeds if he outlived the
beneficiary. In order to eliminate the confusion that prevails as to the effect
of assignment when insured reserves right to change beneficiary but does not
follow procedure set forth in policy, it is suggested that the insurance companies
include in policies a provision that, if the insured reserves the right to change
the beneficiary he can assign without beneficiary's consent and the assignment
will include the beneficiary's interest. This would also avoid a large number
of needless policy changes. A few companies now include such a clause in the
policy. See Holland, Assianinent by the rnsured of Policies which Reserve to
the Insured the Right to Cluange the Beneficiary (1929) 4 Ass'n of Life Insur-
ance Counsel Proceedings 181: 37 C. J. 583, 349; Shandy v. Shandy, 203
Pac. 433, 55 Cal. App. 344 (1921).
Delivery of the policy to assignee might not only decrease likelihood of
the court holding transaction to be testamentary but also would help to counter-
act somewhat the criticism that the trustee has no duties to perform during the
insured's life. See Grahame, loc. cit. supra note 10; HORTON, LrFE INSURANCE
TRUST HANDBOOK 22.
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no testamentary problem. In such a case, the assignee or beneficiary
has a present vested interest that cannot be altered by the settlor 14
and is not affected by the settlor's death. The irrevocable trust is
not usual; 15 ordinarily, the settlor reserves the power to revoke the
trust or change the trustee-beneficiary. There is a divergence of
opinion as to the effect of this clause. Many courts hold that the
trustee-beneficiary has only a contingent interest 16 or an expectancy 17
If the insurance company has no notice of assignment, it would be protected
in paying proceeds to whatever beneficiary was named on the face of the policy.
See Wright, Designation of a Trustee as Beneficiary, Best's Insurance News,
Aug. 1, 1930, 282 et seq.; Fraser, Personal Life Insurance Trusts in N. -Y.
(1930) 16 CORN. L. Q. 19.
Efforts are being made to introduce a uniform form for change of bene-
ficiaries in the creation of insurance trusts. For a list of insurance companies
and a statement of their requirements, see Insurance Trust Bulletin, No. V,
Jan., 1931, issued by American Bankers' Ass'n.
" RFmSEN, op. cit. supra note 6; 7 COOLEY, BRIEFS ON INSURANCE (2d ed.
1928) 6399 ff.; Gurnett v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 268 Ill. App. 518, 191 N. E.
250 (1932) ; Central Nat. Bank of Washington v. Hume, 128 U. S. 195, 9 Sup.
Ct. 41 (1881); Olmstead v. Keyes, 85 N. Y. 593 (1881); Ruppert v. Union
Mutual Ins. Co., 30 N. Y. Super. Ct. (7 Rob. 155) 155 (1867) ; Butler v. State
Mutual Life Assur. Co., 55 Hun 296, 8 N. Y. Supp. 411 (Sup. Ct. 1890) ; Jones
v. North Carolina Mutual & Provident Ass'n, 105 S. C. 472. 90 S. E. 30 (1916);
Roberts v. Northwestern Nat. Life Ins. Co., 143 Ga. 780, 85 S. E. 1043 (1915)
see also Hanna, loc. cit. supra note 8; Vance, The Beneficiary's Interest in a
Life Insurance Policy (1921) 31 YALE L. J. 343. Even if policy expressly
reserves to insured the cash surrender value and loan value, the failure to
expressly reserve right to change beneficiary makes beneficiary's right vested
and irrevocable. Condon v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 183 Iowa 658, 166 N. W. 452
(1918). However, one exception to the rule that if no power to change
beneficiary is reserved, beneficiary has vested right to proceeds in the case of a
beneficiary under a fraternal benefit society certificate. In such case it is
claimed beneficiary had only a naked expectancy. See 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
(1920) 396a and cases there cited with criticism of Brandeis, J.
' Ludwig, loc. cit. supra, note 5.
"37 C. J. 579, 580; Holland, loc. cit. supra note 13; Grahame, loc. cit. supra
note 10 (Mr. Grahame suggests that, in the trend of the courts away from
the old common-law theory that the beneficiary owned the policy, the courts
have leaned over backward and have belittled beneficiary's interest, calling it
"expectant" where, in fact, "contingent" was meant): Elmore v. Continental
Life Ins. Co., 131 Kan. 335, 291 Pac. 755 (1930); Atlantic Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. Gannon, 179 Mass. 291, 60 N. E. 933 (1901); Barbour v. Equitable Life
Assur. Society of U. S., 174 App. Div. 759, 161 N. Y. Supp. (3d Dept. 1916);
Rosman v. Traveler's Ins. of Hartford, 127 Md. 689, 96 AtI. 875 (1916) ; Broga
v. Rome Trust Co. of Rome, N. Y., 151 Misc. 641, 272 N. Y. Supp. 101 (Sup.
Ct. 1934) (part of the trust was held testamentary and, therefore, revoked by
a subsequent will); Union Trust Co. v. Hawkins, 121 Ohio St. 159, 167 N. E.
389 (1929) (Case only reversed because the Ohio statute declared such a trust
non-testamentary) ; Warsco v. Oshkosh Savings & Trust Co., 183 Wis. 156,
196 N. W. 829 (1924); Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Collamore. 100
Me. 578, 62 Atl. 652 (1905) (Where assignor-insured reserved right to divert
proceeds to his estate without assignee's consent, court held that this was an
effort to deprive widow of insured of her interest in his estate and still retain
ownership).
7 Fraser, loc. cit. supra note 13; Burnett v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y.,
66 Ind. App. 280, 114 N. E. 232 (1916) ; Insurance Co. v. Swett. 222 Fed. 200
(C. C. A. 6th, 1915) ; Fisher v. Donovan, 57 Neb. 371, 77 N. W. 778 (1899);
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and that a testamentary disposition during the settlor's life is at-
tempted. However, the preponderance of authority is to the effect
that the beneficiary-trustee has a vested right subject to easy divest-
ment and that no testamentary disposition has been made.' 8 The
tendency to characterize the trustee-beneficiary's rights, as contingent
or expectant, 19 is further checked by the movement of the law toward
Staples v. Murray, 124 Kan. 730, 262 Pac. 558 (1928). Bogert, in Funded
Insurance Trusts and the Rule v. Accumulations (1924) 9 CORN. L. Q. 113, 132,
declared that "beneficiary during the life of the insured has nothing in the
present. All his rights to enjoyment are in the future." It would seem that a
present vested interest could exist even though enjoyment is in the future. St.
Louis Union Trust Co. v. Bassett, 85 S. W. (2d) 569 (Mo. 1935) ; see Ludwig,
loc. cit. supra note 5, Oct. 15, 1935.
1  WILLISTON,, CONTRACTS (1926) 369; Grahame, loc. cit. sitpra note 11;
JoYcE, INsURANcE (2d ed.) §§ 730-a, 731; Corbin, Contracts for Benefit of
Third Person (1918) 27 YALE L. J. 1008 (Third party contract theory will
account, also, for the beneficiary's rights; even though the beneficiary has no
notice of the assignment to him, he has vested interest). Continental Life Ins.
Co. v. Palmer, 42 Conn. 60 (1875) ; Kocharek v. Prudential Ins. Co., 262 Mass.
174, 159 N. E. 520 (1928) ; Prudential Ins. Co. v. Swanson, 111 N. J. Eq. 477,
162 Atl. 597 (1932); Barbin v. Moore. 85 N. H. 362, 159 Atl. 409 (1932);
Gurnett v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 268 Ill. App. 518, 191 N. E. 250 (1932);
Johnston v. Scott, 76 Misc. 641, 137 N. Y. Supp. 243 (Sup. Ct. 1912); Jones
v. Old Colony Trust Co., 251 Mass. 309, 146 N. E. 716 (1925) (Settlor also
reserved the power to withdraw principal and defeat the trust). Even though
both the life income and the power of revocation are reserved, the Statute of
Wills is not considered violated. Lauterbach v. N. Y. Investment Co., 62 Misc.
561, 117 N. Y. Supp. 152 (Sup. Ct. 1909) ; Minrath v. Gifford, 137 App. Div.
919, 122 N. Y. Supp. 1137 (1st Dept. 1910) ; Noble v. Leonard, 87 Pac. 402,
7 Cal. Unrep. 297, aft'd, 94 Pac. 1047. 153 Cal. 245 (1908); McEvoy v. Boston
Five Cents Savings Bank, 201 Mass. 50, 87 N. E. 716 (1909). See also Rawley,
Living Testamentary Dispositions (1929) 3 CINN. L. REV. 361.
However, if donor retains full control over the trust res, even the liberal
Massachusetts courts hold the disposition to be testamentary. Jones v. Old
Colony Trust Co., 251 Mass. 309, 146 N. E. 716 (1925). See also Talbot v.
Talbot, 32 R. I. 72, 78 Atl. 535 (1911); Robb v. Washington & Jefferson
College, 185 N. Y. 485, 78 N. E. 359 (1906).
It has been contended that no title passed to the trustee during the life of
the insured unless the policy is assigned and, therefore, no trust arises. Trustee
is merely a bailee of the policy, the insured remaining owner. See Fraser,
loc. cit. supra note 13.
Even though the view that it is a contingent interest prevails, the beneficiary
may still have an interest enough to form the basis for a presently arising trust.
See 1 PERRY, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (7th ed. 1929) § 68; Title Ins. and Trust
Co. v. Duffill, 191 Cal. 629, 218 Pac. 14 (1923).
Yet, several courts have held that the retention of the life interest coupled
with the reservation of the power of revocation, was consistent with a present
trust, Barlow v. Loomis, 19 Fed. 677 (C. C. A. 5th, 1184) ; Nichols v. Emery,
109 Colo. 323, 41 Pac. 1089 (1895) ; Braun v. Fidelity Trust Co., 126 Md. 175,
94 Atl. 523 (1915) ; National Newark, etc. Bank v. Rosahl, 97 N. J. Eq. 74,
128 Atl. 586 (1925). It would seem that these trusts assume a quasi-testamentary
aspect. See Horton, The Testamentary Nature of Settlements of Life Insurance
Elected by the Beneficiary (1932) 17 CORN. L. Q. 72; 1 PERRY, TRUSTS (7th
ed. 1929) § 97.
"' Grahame, loc. cit. supra note 10.
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greater certainty. 20 It should be noted that the tax cases also treat
the insurance trust in which the right to revoke is reserved as a non-
testamentary arrangement.
21
As long as no obvious attempt is made to avoid the Statute of
Wills and the insurance trust is used solely for its administrative
utility,22 it will not be invalidated.2 3 Only the elements of a trust
need be present to cause the courts to treat it with leniency.24
The Rule Against Remoteness of Vesting.
The principal purpose of the Rule Against Remoteness of
Vesting is to prevent the tying up of property and to keep it in
commerce 25 by stipulating that, at the end of a specified period,26
the absolute interest of each person in the property must vest.2 7 If
there is a possibility that the interests will not vest within the period,
the whole transaction is bad.
It is generally assumed that the insurance trust is limited by the
Rule Against Remoteness. 28 The lives on which the trust must be
'Ludwig, N. Y. L. J., Oct. 16, 1935, at 1278. The condition subsequent is
favored over the condition precedent, thereby strengthening the trend toward
the theory of vested remainder subject to defeasance.
'Succession tax does not apply to insurance trust funds. Tyler v. Treas-
urer and Receiver General, 226 Mass. 306, 115 N. E. 300 (1917).
-For example, the insurance trust need not be probated. It should be
noted that the transaction presents few opportunities for fraud. Both insurer
and trustee will be alert to detect forgeries, fraud and undue influence. See
Note (1924) 38 HARV. L. REV. 243; Note (1933) 46 HARv. L. REV. 818.
' See Prof. Bordwell's letter to Mr. Grahame, loc. cit. supra note 10, at
410. See Hanna, loc. cit supra note 8, at 357.
' REmSEN, op. cit. supra note 6, at 330; for methods to avoid testamentary
question, see Yost, Paper presented before the Ass'n of Life Insurance Counsel,
Dec. 9, 1930, at 588, where the suggestion is made merely to designate a trustee in
the trust agreement to receive the proceeds. No effort is here made to assign
the policy or designate the trustee as beneficiary; see also Lauterbach v. N. Y.
Investment Co., 62 Misc. 561, 117 N. Y. Supp. 152 (1909) ; Minrath v. Gifford,
137 App. Div. 919, 122 N. Y. Supp. 1137 (1st Dept. 1910).
' Hanna. loc. cit. supra note 8, at 358; GRAY, RULE V. PERPETUITIES (3d ed.
ed. 1919) 201; Danziger, Proceedings, Ass'n of Life Insurance Counsel, May,
1930.
In New York, the period is two lives in being. See Hanna, loc. cit. supra
note 8, at 387 et seq. for list of statutory modifications of the common-law
rule, lives in being and twenty-one years. See KALES, FUTURE INTERESTS (2d
ed. 1920) (Illinois law); CHAPIN, SUSPENSION OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION
(3d ed. 1928) (New York law).
"Professor Gray is the leading exponent of the widely accepted view that
the Rule is a bar only to remoteness of vesting. GRAY, Op. cit. supra note 25,
§§ 2a. l18a, 268. 278; for criticism of this view, see REEVES, REAL PROPERTY
(1909) §§ 95, 75.
See Proceedings, Equitable Trust Co. Conference, at pp. 44, 45; Pro-
ceedings, Twelfth Midwinter Conference, Feb., 1931, at pp. 101, 130. The Rule
is considered applicable to all future equitable interests in property that are
not vested. GRAY, op. cit. mipra note 25. 323. The Rule applies to changeable
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based are lives in being at the time of the execution of the trust
agreement.2 9 As insurance trusts are rarely created by will,3 it may
be that children will be born to the settlor after the execution of the
trust agreement. But, the trust cannot by its terms last for their
lives because they were not in existence when the agreement was
executed. However, if the period runs from the date of the settlor's
death, such provision may be validly made in the trust agreement
for them. Although there have been no cases decided on this point,31
the few authorities who have considered this problem have con-
cluded that, since an interest arises in the trustee-beneficiary during
the life of the insured to which a trust may attach, the period should
run from the time of the trust agreement.32
But, when a trust agreement provides that the settlor retain a
power of revocation of the trust, one person is given complete con-
trol 33 and the courts wisely exclude the period of the settlor's life
from the computation. 34 The Rule seeks only to prevent the tying
up of actual property interests and when the settlor retains complete
control, the interest of the cestuis 35 is so slight that it should not be
regarded as an interest at all and the Rule should not concern itself
with it during the life of the settlor, that is, the life of the settlor
funds as well as interests in particular pieces of property. § 202a. Thus it is
immaterial whether the claim of the trustee-beneficiary is against the insurance
company's funds during the insured's life or against the proceeds of the policy
at the insured's death. But, it seems that the Rule does not apply to settlement
options of insurance companies, although this has been questioned. See HORTON,
POWER OF AN INSURED TO CONTROL THE PROCEEDS OF His POLICIES (1926) c. IV.
' GRAY, op. cit. supra note 25, § 201.
' Hanna. loc. cit. supra note 8, at 359.
' Note (1930) 45 HARV. L. REv. 896; O'TooLE, LAW OF TRUSTS (1935)
§ 120.
1SCULLY, LIFE INSURANCE TRUSTS (1927) 31; REmsEN, op. cit. supra
note 6; SHATTUCK, THE LIVING INSURANCE TRUST (1928) 40; Note (1930) 45
HARV. L. REV. 896. See cases cited in footnote 18, supra, in support of theory
of vesting at the time the trust was created, but cf. Fraser, loc. cit. supra note
13, at 21 et seq.
' In Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339, 49 Sup. Ct. 123
(1929), the settlor received the right to revoke a trust holding property for
himself during his life and remainder over at his death. The settlor was
considered the owner of the property, in complete control of it and subject
to an estate tax. Cf. Minot v. Treasurer, 207 Mass. 588, 93 N. E. 973 (1911).
Contra: Matter of Lansing, 182 N. Y. 238, 74 N. E. 882 (1905) (two Judges
dissenting); Matter of Chapman, 133 App. Div. 337, 117 N. Y. Supp. 679,
aff'd, 196 N. Y. 561, 90 N. E. 1157 (1909) (two Judges dissenting).
" See GRAY, op. cit. supra note 25, §§ 203, 268; Note (1933) HARV. L. REV.
896; Mifflin's Appeal, 121 Pa. 205 (1881) (When power of appointment is
granted, period runs from time of exercise, not from time of creation). Wheeler
v. Fellowes, 52 Conn. 230 (1884) is distinguishable because there, although one
person was in complete control, the beneficial interests in the trust were tied
up too long. GRAY, § 269.
The beneficiary named in the trust agreement, not to be confused with
the trustee-beneficiary, who is designated in the insurance policy as beneficiary.
1936 ]
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should not be one of the lives in being by which the period of the
Rule is measured. 36
Hence, by considering the power of the settlor over the policy,
we can determine whether his life is to be one of the two lives in
being during which New York permits an interest to remain un-
vested. Where the right to change the beneficiary is not reserved
and where the trustee is the beneficiary under the policy, the period
of limitation plainly is to run from the date of creation of the
trust.3 7  But, where the right to change the beneficiary is reserved,
the insured is the dominus of the policy during his lifetime and that
period should be disregarded. The settlor is considered the owner
of the policy for most purposes. Thus, under the Federal Estate
Tax, the proceeds of the policy above the $40,000 exemption are re-
garded as part of the insured's taxable estate.38 Further, during the
insured's lifetime, the policy may pass to his trustee in bankruptcy.3 9
If the power to revoke the trust is reserved in the trust agree-
ment but the insurance policy irrevocably designates the trustee as
beneficiary, the settlor does not possess the power of revocation be-
cause it would destroy the trustee-beneficiary's vested interest.40
In such a case, the settlor is divested of his remaining interest, the
power to revoke, and the interest of the cestuis becomes correspond-
ingly substantial (but not vested) during the settlor's life, as well as
during the period that the trust agreement is to continue after his
death. This interest is, therefore, within the scope of the Rule. The
settlor's life, therefore, must be included in the computation of the
period.
If the insurance policy does not refer to the trust agreement
and the trust agreement creates an irrevocable trust, the agreement
controls. Here the settlor does not possess the power of revocation
and the Rule above stated prevails. 41
GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (2d ed. 1906) 167, 196. At best, it
would seem that the cestui had a contract right in the trust res. The Rule does
not apply to creation of contract rights. See GRAY, 291. The exponents of
this theory would in all probability maintain that, while the interest that passed
to the cestui was too slight to come under the Rule Against Remoteness of
Vesting, the interest that the trustee-beneficiary acquired was great enough to be
considered an inter-vivos transaction and therefore non-testamentary.
' See 1 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 18, § 396; 7 COOLEY, BRIEFS ON
INSURANCE (2d ed. 1928) 6399; Wells, The "Change of Beneficiary" Clause in
Insurance Policies (1914) 2 VA. L. REV. 49. It is said that the beneficiary has
an indefeasible, vested right. In fact, an attempt by the legislature to deprive
the beneficiary of his interest may be unconstitutional. Blum v. N. Y. Life
Ins. Co., 197 Mo. 513, 95 S. W. 317 (1906).
' Chase Nat. Bank v. United States, 278 U. S. 327, 49 Sup. Ct. 126 (1929).
"Cohen v. Samuels, 245 U. S. 50, 38 Sup. Ct. 36 (1917) ; In re Greenberg,
271 Fed. 258 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921); see COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY (13th ed. 1923)
1697. See also note 34, supra.
" 37 C. J. 423; Low, Paper presented before the Ass'n of Life Ins. Counsel,
May 24, 1929.
" Danziger, loc. cit. supra note 25.
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If the settlor reserves the right in the insurance policy to change
the beneficiary and the trust agreement irrevocably designates a trus-
tee who is beneficiary under the policy, the trust agreement controls,
the settlor being permitted to restrict the rights he possessed under
the policy by a later agreement 42 and again the life of the settlor
must be included in the computation of the period.
Only where the insurance policy provides that the settlor can
change the beneficiary and the trust agreement grants the settlor
the right to revoke, should the life of the settlor be excluded from the
computation.
Where it is doubtful whether the settlor's life should be included
in the computation, a safety clause may be inserted in the trust agree-
ment providing for an automatic termination of the trust within the
legal period.43
It would seem that a completely satisfactory result would be
achieved only if the Rule is confined to its proper sphere, that is,
for two lives in being at the death of the insured, because only then
would the ordinary limitation to the donor's wife and children for
life and then, after the death of the last survivor to then living
grandchildren be considered valid.
The Suspension of the Power of Alienation.
If there are not persons in esse during the legal period who could
together convey the entire fee, the power of alienation is suspended.44
In most jurisdictions there are no strictures placed on the power to
execute a trust creating an inalienable interest in the beneficiary.45
In New York, however, the interest of the cestui in the ordinary
trust to receive the income from the proceeds of the matured policy
is rendered inalienable by statute.46 Such a trust must be limited
to two lives in being 47 at the date of the instrument.4
Where the policies are irrevocably assigned to the trustee, the
power of alienation is suspended at the time of the assignment un-
less all the cestuis are in being and are capable of consenting to revo-
cation by the settlor. In the latter case, there are persons in being
2Ibid.
" For other methods used to keep the trust within the Rule, see Proceedings,
loc. cit. supra note 28.
" Hanna, loc. cit. supra note 8, at 360.
" See Hanna, loc. cit. supra note 8, 387 et seq.
11N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW (1923) § 103; N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW (1923) § 15.
"Coster v. Lorillard, 14 Wend. 265 (N. Y. 1835) ; cf. OKLA. CoMP. STAT.
ANN. (1921) § 8412; N. Y. PERS. PROP LAW § 11, as amended by N. Y. Laws
1929, c. 229, § 18.
" There has been no express adjudication of the meaning of the phrase
"date of instrument" in the New York statute (CoNsoL. LAWS) c. 41 (PERs.
PROP. LAW) § 11. It would seem that the legislature means the effective date
of the instrument, not the date of execution of the instrument.
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who can convey absolute title in possession and therefore there is no
suspension during the life of the settlor. 49
Where the trust is funded, a different situation exists because
the income from a trust fund is to be applied to the use of another,
and such a trust has been declared inalienable by statute in New
York.50 The reasoning with respect to the possibility of alienation
of the interests of the cestuis is, therefore, inapplicable. 5 1
Where there is an irrevocable assignment of the policy and all
the cestuis are not adults, it has been suggested that the power of
alienation will have been suspended for one life when the insured dies
and may be suspended for but one more life.52 If the power of revo-
cation is reserved and the policy assigned to the trustee, it would
seem that there is no suspension of the power of alienation during
the insured's life as a practical consideration,58 because, after the
exercise of the power of revocation, the settlor can deal with the
policy as he pleases.54
The Rule Against Accumulations.
The unfunded insurance trust does not come within the Ride
Against Accumulations because in such a case there is no disposition
of an estate that would deprive someone of the present enjoyment of
the income from the estate and augment the value of the trust estate.55
However, an estate is set aside in the funded insurance trust and the
alleged violation of the Rule Against Accumulations by the funded
" N. Y. CONSOL. LAWS. c. 41, PERS. PROP. LAW § 23. Williams v. Sage,
180 App. Div. 1, 167 N. Y. Supp. 179 (2d Dept. 1917) ; Cozzani v. Title Guar-
anty Trust Co., 175 App. Div. 369, 161 N. Y. Supp. 884 (Ist Dept. 1916), aff'd,
220 N. Y. 683, 116 N. E. 1040 (1917) ; Whittemore v. Equity Trust Co., 250
N. Y. 298, 165 N. E. 454 (1929); Wells v. Squires, 117 App. Div. 508, 102
N. Y. Supp. 597 (1st Dept. 1907), aft'd, 191 N. Y. 529, 84 N. E. 1122 (1908).
See CHAPLIN, SUSPENSION OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION AND POSTPONEMENT
OF VESTING UNDER LAWS OF N. Y. (3d ed. 1928) § 490.
IN. Y. CONSOL. LAWS, c. 41, PERS. PROP. LAW § 15. In re U. S. Mortgage
& Trust Co., 130 Misc. 635, 224 N. Y. Supp. 599 (Surr. Ct. 1927) ; Matter of
Flint, 118 Misc. 354, 193 N. Y. Supp. 319 (1922).
" See Fraser, loc. cit. supra note 13, at 27.
' See Fraser, Ioc. cit. supra note 13.
'See Fraser, c. cit. supra note 13.
Equitable Trust Co. of N. Y. v. Pratt, 117 Misc. 708, 193 N. Y. Supp.
152 (Sup. Ct. 1922), aff'd, 206 App. Div. 689, 199 N. Y. Supp. 921 (1st Dept.
1923). A bill was introduced in the present session of the New York Assembly
by Mr. H. R. F. Piper, which was a legislative adoption of the rule in
Equitable Trust Co. of N. Y. v. Pratt, providing that the period of suspension
of alienation run from the death of the settlor for two lives in esse at the time
of his death. The bill was killed in committee. See Bill introduced in Penn-
sylvania Legislature, 52 T. C. M. 723; see also Ludwig, loc. cit. supra note 5,
Oct. 17, 1935, at p. 1324.
"Hascall v. King, 162 N. Y. 134, 145, 58 N. E. 515, 518 (1900) ; see N. Y.
REAL PROP. LAW § 61; N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 16.
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insurance trust 56 has provoked considerable debate. Those who hold
that it is an accumulation claim that each payment of the premiums
from the trust fund increases the size of the chose in action by in-
creasing the cash surrender value. Such a contention is open to
serious attack. The chose in action never increases in size but always
remains the value of the insurance. What actually occurs when the
premiums are paid is that the claim is maintained at the amount of
the insurance and is prevented from shrinking to nothing by default.
The cash surrender value is simply the portion of the chose in action
that is left after default.57
Even if were assumed that the insurance trust does involve a
technical accumulation, there is no difficulty because in practically all
cases the insured's life is the period of such accumulation and in the
great majority of states an accumulation for one life is permitted. s8
In New York 59 and several other states, only accumulations for
a minority and for a minor's benefit are sanctioned. 0 However, the
funded insurance trust has been specifically excepted from the opera-
tion of the rule.61 This amendment permits an accumulation if the
policy is part of the trust res, that is, the policy must be assigned to
the trustee. If not assigned, the trust in its entirety would be subject
to attack as an accumulation.6 2  Also, the statute refers only to the
income from the fund that is used to pay the premiums. It is still
unlawful to accumulate the surplus over the amount needed for the
premiums. Therefore, provision should be made for the payment
of the surplus to a third party or for the purchase of more insurance
and, also, the disposition of any proceeds that might be realized be-
See McCarliss, 37 T. C. M. 695; Redfield, 38 T. C. M. 355; Milne, 38
T. C. M. 515; Bogert, loc. cit. supra note 17, 113 et seq.; BOGERT, Op. cit. supra
note 7, §§ 215-17; Hanna, loc. cit. supra note 8, at 360; 1 JARMAN, WHLLs (4th
ed. 1881) 316, 317 (6th ed. 1910) 391 et seq.
' The English courts refuse to apply the Rule Against Accumulations to
insurance trusts. Bassil v. Lister, 9 Hare 177; In re Vaughn, 18 Wk. N. 89;
Cathcart's Trustees v. Heneagel's Trustees, 61 Ct. Sess. Cas. 1205; In re
Gardiner, 1 Ch. 697 (1901) ; Thellusson Act, 39 and 40 Geo. III, c. 98 (1800).
"See 2 BOGERT, Op. cit. mpra note 7, § 216(b) for list of states.
9 In Matter of Hartman's Estate, 126 Misc. 862, 215 N. Y. Supp. 802
(Surr. Ct. 1926), the settlor transferred a policy on another's life to a trustee
under a funded trust agreement. The court held that it was not an accumulation.
The reasoning of the court has been seriously challenged. See HANNA, op. Cit.
supra note 8, at 368-70.
"N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 61; N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 16.
N. Y. Laws 1927, cc. 384, 681; Laws 1928, c. 172; PERS. PROP. LAW
(1927) c. 41, § 16, last paragraph.
"When an invalid accumulation occurs in an insurance trust created by
will only the invalid portion is stricken out. If it is an inter-vivos transaction,
the entire agreement is declared invalid because the settlor, being alive, has
another opportunity to make a valid trust. Mann-Vynne v. Equitable Trust
Co., 201 App. Div. 149, 194 N. Y. Supp. 50 (lst Dept. 1922); Herzig v. Herzig,
140 App. Div. 514, 125 N. Y. Supp. 402 (1st Dept. 1910).
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fore the insured's death. For example, if a policy lapsed and the
cash surrender value is taken, it cannot be accumulated.
Many funded insurance trust agreements provide that, on the
insured's death, the proceeds from the policy should be added to the
trust fund that the trustee already holds and that the income from
the entire fund be paid to certain life beneficiaries until the end of
the trust.63 Such a provision might violate the Rule Against Per-
petuities because the ownership of the trust income fund may have
been already suspended for one life in being at the death of the
insured.
Conclusion.
The life insurance trust is of great value to the person who
wishes to provide for periodic payments to his wife or child, who
has several policies, who desires to arrange for certain contingencies:
marriage, births, deaths, or, who wants to benefit various friends and
relatives. It is also useful where the insured does not know exactly
what disposition to make of the proceeds. A discretionary trustee is
far better than a rigid option settlement in such a case. Further,
the clauses protecting the donees against creditors may be attached
to trusts generally but may not be available in favor of beneficiaries
of option settlements. Finally, it stimulates saving if the trust is
unfunded and, in the case of a funded trust, guarantees provision for
the donor's family, even though he suffers financial reverses. How-
ever, the fact that insurance trusts are socially desirable should not
blind us to the tendency to mingle trust funds with general corpo-ate
funds. The consequent absence of a specific res, one of the primary
requisites of a trust, creates doubt as to whether, in such cases, a
trust actually exists in the form that we have known it in the past.
ARTHUR S. MARGULIS.
632 BOGERT, op. cit. suprna note 7.
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